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Schrödinger and Nietzsche on Life:
The Eternal Recurrence of the Same
Babette Babich

The Now
The phenomenological question of consciousness1 usually associated with Husserl
(although there are echoes of this in Augustine as in Marcus Aurelius, Kant and
Schopenhauer) is the consciousness of the now, the present moment. I explore this
consciousness for Erwin Schrödinger, which for him included reference to the
Upanishads together with Nietzsche’s central teaching or “thinking” of the eternal
recurrence of the same.2
We are familiar with the physical and cybernetic framework of the question of life as
Schrödinger himself posed it and indeed Schrödinger is celebrated as one of the first to
pose this question using the framework of physics, itself increasingly the standard for the
biological sciences today. Nietzsche, who is usually associated with the death of God and
the will to power in the popular mind, also raised the question of life, drawing upon both
Schopenhauer3 and Kant as well as classical philosophy and letters.4 In addition,
Nietzsche’s critically reflexive philosophical,5 approach to the sciences — not unlike the
approach Mary Midgely has always urged, most recently in her defense of Ruper
Sheldrake’s The Science Delusion,6 as did indeed Paul Feyerabend, and others — meant
that he directed his own questioning of life “to the physicists” as well as “the
philosophers” whom he charges with dealing death as — “nothing,” he writes, “escapes
their hands alive.” (TI, Reason in Philosophy).
Susan Sontag refers to Nietzsche in her diaries without giving the source. When I was
asked about this reference, I surmised that Sontag assimilated two different loci,
metonymically, as the mind works. The most important locus was the most evident one,
shades of Poe’s Purloined Letter. This was the “Thought of Death.” (GS §278)

Susan Sontag’s son, david Rieff closes his book, Swimming in a Sea of Death, with a
reference to “the melancholy happiness”7 Nietzsche tells his readers he “derives from the
spectacle of human beings loving life”8 all the while avoiding even the slightest “thought
of death.”9 Nietzsche’s point does not parallel Sontag’s citation from Kierkegaard: “life
must be lived prospectively but can only be understood retrospectively”10 — nor Rieff’s
own melancholy addition that “by then, it is usually too late.”11 Instead, Nietzsche’s
ambition for all those human, all-too-human lovers of life was “to do something that
would make the thought of life even a hundred times more appealing to them.”12
The point exceeds the philosophical chestnut that as mortal beings, we are defined in our
essence by our mortality and by our awareness of the same. Thus the poet Robert Burns’
gave himself to reflect in a poem on his ruination of the chance for life of a small mouse,
inadvertently, as he plowed the field. The Scots poet echoes Nietzsche’s insight into life
and brevity: whoever has not now already built a house, will no longer be building one.
What distinguishes us, ‘proximally and for the most part’ as Heidegger says, echoing
Nietzsche, echoing Seneca, is less that we are mortal and can think about death but that
we don’t think of it. And as Heidegger reminds us, the best way, the all-too-human way
not to think of death is to insist that that we do think about. As everyone knows and
everyone says: everyone dies. As Slavoj Žižek, as a Hegelian does not quite believe in
the finality of things, underscores: “And so on and so on.”
Nietzsche tells us this, as does indeed Pierre Hadot and the Austrian priest Ivan Illich and
Heidegger and Schopenhauer, along with the ancients. Thus the classically philosophical
insight that in our lack of concern with death we also lack a concern with life. In our
(obviously Hobbesian) struggle to get ahead of everyone (this is the context of the
aphorism which is set in Italy, at an emigrant’s port), as we seek to outreach everyone in
medias res, in and through our ambitions “to be the first in this future,” we do not see that
“death and deathly silence alone are certain and common to all in this future.” (GS §278)
The classical focus on fate and its conflicts with desire echoes in Rieff’s quote from the
Marxist and Irish historian of science, J. F. Bernal from The World, the Flesh & the
Devil: “there is ‘the history of desire and the history of fate and man’s reason has never

learned to distinguish them.’”13

Like Nietzsche and Schrödinger, Bernal contrasts

religion with science and Buddhism.14
Nietzsche argues that science differs from religion in that science locates its promised
fantasy of salvation not in the afterlife but in the world: the here and now.15 Rupert
Sheldrake’s above mentioned The Science Delusion is only a recent contribution to the
blinders that tend to be required to believe in that same salvific science, a more pellucid
example of which can be found in the gerontological phantasms of Kurzweil’s The
Singularity.16

Schrödinger’s Cat and Nietzsche’s Madness
Like Nietzsche, Schrödinger is surrounded with myth. Where Nietzsche’s myths turn on
his will to power, his proclamation of the death of God, or his madness or supposed
syphilis,17 Schrödinger’s myths testify to his mathematical and quantum mechanical
genius. Some of these myths turn on Schrödinger’s equation, others involve his quantum
thought-experiment regarding a complicated way to kill a cat — the point being not the
death of the cat (this ultimate outcome is given) but the uncertainty of knowing the
life/death state of the cat in question at any specific time.
Now the cat, locked in his box, and no matter whether he is (still) alive or (already) dead,
is unfortunate in any case. In this respect the cat is like every animal used in science and
at every step of the way from their breeding and birth or still all-too-commonly from their
‘collection’ from the wild as well as pets taken from animal shelters to use in scientific
experiments (pets are more docile because they — erroneously — expect kindness), and
of course, virtually all of them are killed as part of the research project, and this is
universally so when it comes to cats used in studies of perception and so many other
things. A one-way street for the animals, scientific research on animals presumes a logic
of death.
It is its’ verisimilitude, echoing both the gas chambers then and still used in the fatuously
named animal ‘shelters,’ the practice of experimental science guarantees Schrödinger’s
cat example its macabre force. By using the fact and time of death as an experimental

index or indicator describes what is done in all branches of science, especially in but not
only the biological and psychological sciences, especially in these days of neuroscience
but also in chemistry and physics, and also medicine and military science.18 At issue is
one state or the other: is the cat alive or dead? Schrödinger’s humor is what puts a point
on the significance and the paradox of quantum indeterminability which works as a
thought experiment just because death is a quantifiable index: a ready-made gauge.
Where would the chemist Robert Boyle have been with his air-pump — how would the
dispute with Thomas Hobbes have been settled? — in the absence of an array of suitably
suffocated mice and canaries as mute witnesses?19
Beyond the ailurophobic example of the cat — is ‘it’ alive or dead20 — this question also
illuminates the measurement paradox of the quantum state as Schrödinger. The furthest
thing from a joke — although in popular culture, even in university contexts, it is nearly
always greeted with hilarity — Schrödinger’s thought experiment assumes the then and
still current practice of experimental science, which depends upon an overwhelmingly
massive utilization not only of cats but other animals “sacrificed” for the sake of science.
Schrödinger’s “burlesque” example21 offers a graphic illumination of the significance of
quantum indeterminability.22 Nietzsche would have reminded us that living experience is
indeterminate from start to finish and not merely as one or the other of two, mutually
exclusive “states” (and it is because Schrödinger can take these to be opposites that his
experiment works as it does). By contrast, for Nietzsche, life includes every discrete
continuum of stages of life as well as stages of death: “The living is only a species of the
dead, and a very rare variety.” (GS §109)
For the scientist (as for the military mind), half-dead however (the cat suffering in the
box) counts as “alive.” Elsewhere I have argued that this same military insensitivity
informs Nietzsche’s aphorism, “From the military school of life— What does not kill me,
makes me stronger.”23 Having survived a siege, one can be urged to fight on in the
morning or in the face the devastation of the loss of limbs, friends, family, etc.24
The issue of the “subject” (and correspondingly, the issue of objectivity) is only an issue
for the scientist, the “observer.”25 Hence science refuses (no matter the results of its
experiments) to attribute anything like “subjectivity” to its animal subjects — and this is

part of the issue that Mary Midgley has with the current mind-matter world view as we
cited it at the start — and to this extent, brain science and cognitive psychology including
(the term behavior is a dead or Cartesian-laden give-away) behaviourism, always
neutralizes animals as objects that is: as things.26 Nor does it matter in the end whether
animals in experimental situations learn to speak, or to use language or tools, or
recognize themselves in mirrors, or whatever we ask. For us, they remain things, and
when the experiment is over we recycle them for other experiments and ultimately, such
is our concern to examine their brains, “sacrifice” them.27
I have attended to the issue of animals because it brings some real-life context into
contrast with the scientific ideal of Schrödinger the myth,28 rather as if he were a power
wrestler, corresponding to the Schrödinger equation as perfect symbolic signifier. In the
case of Schrödinger’s What is Life? this same mathematical mystique characterizing the
image of Schrödinger in science, popular culture, and philosophy (rather in that order)
distracts us from reading what he says to us. Hence when we think of Schrödinger we do
not think of the mythic traditions that concerned him, from the ancient Greeks to the Sufi
and Vedic traditions, we think of his wave equation or his unfortunate cat example.
Schrödinger himself was not particularly worried about cats. His example was meant to
illustrate that fundamental quantum physics challenges the ordinary assumptions of
ordinary observation, that is: space and time, together with the identity of the observed.
Hence Schrödinger reflects that quantum theory “tells us that what was formerly
considered as the most obvious and fundamental property of the corpuscles, namely their
being identifiable individuals, has only a limited significance.”29 Thus the traditionally
Laplacian expectation of an eventually calculable vision of the universe is demonically
set on edge:
Only when a corpuscle is moving with sufficient speed in a region not too
crowded with corpuscles of the same kind does its identity remain (nearly)
unambiguous. Otherwise it becomes blurred.30
A consummate mathematician, Schrödinger emphasizes that what is at stake is what is
called bi-locality:

And by this assertion we do not mean to indicate merely our practical
inability to follow the movement of the particle in question; the very
notion of absolute identity is held to be inadmissable.”31
With respect to what Patrick A. Heelan has called the “observable,”32 at issue for
Schrödinger is the subjective consciousness of the observer. The problem is
consciousness and this is a constitutive problem:
…science in is the attempt to describe and understand Nature simplifies…
The scientist subconsciously, almost inadvertently, simplifies his problem
of understanding nature by disregarding or cutting out of the
representation of the world that is to be constructed his own person, the
knowing subject.33
This tendency to pretend to the God trick, or as Nietzsche puts it, to phrase questions in
terms of what the world would look like if one had cut one’s head off and if one could
still take a look), reflects the problem, and the idealization, of objectivity.

Nietzsche: What is Life?
In The Gay Science aphorism entitled What is Life? Nietzsche deploys his characteristic
style of repetition punctuated by his customary thought slash. We get the rhythm of his
refraction of the question, meaning that the reply to the question is and is not the answer,
“Life — that is, continually shedding something that wants to die.” (GS §26) The rest of
the aphorism gets more obscure, sentence by sentence, and it can be hard to know how to
take what Nietzsche says here. And Nietzsche goes on to rephrase the claim: “Life —
that is: being cruel and inexorable against everything about us that is growing old and
weak — and not only about us.” (GS §26)
Does Nietzsche mean this? Is he no more than what fans of Ayn Rand and “easyNietzsche” — a kind of fascist, a Nazi avant la lettre? EZNietzsche, like FakeZizek on
Twitter, would thus be little more than a 19th century Callicles or Hobbes — bristling
British: nasty, brutish, and short. Whereby Nietzsche’s point would only be: and now we
are back to our Sartrean seduction scene over apricot martinis or ‘just coffee’: got to
catch youth while you may.

A reading of this kind is great for the post-humanists, the transhumanists, who wish to
argue that Nietzsche was a transhumanist in advance (what, so they say, does his talk of
the Overman really mean?),34 which transhumanist persuasion is to be sharply
distinguished from those transhumanists (like Nick Böstrom, for one) who are
discomfited by the comparison and wish to keep Nietzsche at a massive distance (“easy”
Nietzsche does seem to come with all those fascist, “easy” social Darwinian overtones
mentioned at the start of the current section).35
Here we note, that Nietzsche contends against Darwin and is thus not a Darwinist,36 and
he contends contra Malthus and he is accordingly no Malthusian. For Nietzsche, the
simplicity of Darwin’s argument, like that of Malthus, happens to miss the point when it
comes to the question of life, which was for Nietzsche the question of the organic and the
inorganic, the question of the vital and the dead, the question of excess and abundance
and the question of lack and debility which for Nietzsche was always a sign of either a
sickness unto death or that from which one might eventually and, given good luck, —
which for Nietzsche entailed good climate, good air, good times — even convalesce. In a
Nachlass note we read what Nietzsche says about “the organic,” when he names it
“merely” and no more than “variety of the inorganic, and a very rare variety,”
emphasizing that “the entire opposition between the organic and inorganic belongs to the
phenomenal world.”37
The issue is similar to the point Schrödinger makes with respect to the subject when it
comes to explaining the mind in his Mind and Matter. For Schrödinger, referring to what
the brain factually is, as supposed by those who invoke “brain states,” the problem is that
such brain states do not and cannot tell us anything at all about consciousness, if by that
we don’t mean (but it turns out that we always do mean) the inevitably circular claim of
electroencephalographic data findings regarded as signifying brain states.38 For
Schrödinger, we are no better off with our modern findings than we would be if we
limited ourselves to observed behaviour. For Schrödinger, “real consciousness” refers to
your consciousness of you, the subject and your subjective self, as opposed to that of
your neighbor, as opposed to the consciousness of the person sitting next to you, behind
you, two chairs away, the consciousness of a lover, the consciousness of a friend, an
enemy, a stranger on the train.39

We are not even, this is Schrödinger’s point, conscious of ourselves when it comes to our
past selves, that is: as we were yesterday, last week, ten years ago, thirty years ago, as
Nietzsche too made similar observations.
For Schrödinger, and his point may be found more musically in Augustine’s famous book
XI of his Confessions, one is never conscious of anything but the present and that
changes from moment to moment. One is (no longer) consciousness of the past, one is
not (yet) conscious of the future. And our collective sadness at the massacre of civilians
including children in Pakistan and Syria (ah but we should also add Libya and
Afghanistan and Iraq and so many, many other places, especially in Palestine and Africa)
and deaths everywhere, indeed, even animal (especially noteworthy given all the animals
we kill, that is the almost unimaginable scope of our rapacity, and for all the reasons we
kill them — and I cannot even begin to speak of the trees and other plants as we never,
never do) betrays our awareness that what is lost in death is every potential, every
possible conscious moment: from now on in. For Nietzsche observes that science has no
intention of limiting itself to the phenomenal domain. The physics that deposes the
metaphysics of the schools turns out to be interested in nothing but the metaphysical
domain:
That all appearance [Erscheinung] is material [Materie] is clear: therefore the
natural sciences have a justified goal. Because to be material is to be
appearance. But at the same time it turns out that that the natural sciences are
only interested in what lies behind the appearance [Shein]: which it handles with
high seriousness as reality.”40
In the context of the Greeks, as Schrödinger argues41 and hence with regard to the
Pythagorean/Orphic tradition, that is Empedocles, Nietzsche reflects that such a logical,
scientific sensibility was ancient Greek science, “everything inorganic has come to be on
the basis of the organic, as dead organic material. Cadaver and human being.”42
Nietzsche converts this point and thus he speaks of will to power. One can have the
autotelic organization or dynamism of organic matter only if as he writes “it is already
present at hand in the suitable or relevant inorganic matter.”43

And if this were a different essay, I would seek to draw a connection between Nietzsche,
this would be the Irigaray move, as a thinker of the sea, and for me this recalls the eternal
laughter of Aeschylus, the wave greedy for its prey, existence on the model of a beautiful
sea creature sunning itself on the rocks, and all too literally a matter of wave and form:
The exchange of raising and sinking [Hebung und Senkung], the wave [Wogen]
is the simplest type. The wave form is in almost all preliminary stages of nature:
all movements disseminate themselves in this. Rhythm has dominion over the
entirety of so-called dead existence [sogennant todtes Dasein].44
As a reader of Helmholtz and others, Nietzsche means this as scientifically as you please
and he emphasizes the pulsing form of wave mechanics and human sensation, that “we
experience impressions of light and sound as constant, although they are rhythmic”45 and
in this same sense he reminds us that we are not able to perceive movement, which must
necessarily vanish in order to be perceived, leading to an exactly “static effect.”46 But we
„do not perceive movement.“47 Nietzsche, the scholar of ancient philosophy that he was,
probably repeats nothing more often than this.
Indeed Nietzsche reflects, the more science we have, the more theoretically advanced we
are, the more we are able to come to perceive “movement, restlessness, happenings.”48
This takes an enormous amount of time and even then:
the human belief in “things” has become so unshakably solidified, just like the
belief in matter. But there are no things, everything is in flux [alles fliesst] –
thus speaks insight but the instinct contradicts it at every moment.49
As Nietzsche repeats, following Schopenhauer but also the science of his day (think again
of Mach):50 “Matter itself is an age-old, enfleshed prejudice [uraltes eingefleischtes
Vorurtheil].”51 Nietzsche’s point here is that this prejudice is incorrigible — and this
incorrigibility is the hardest aspect of Nietzsche’s epistemological, scientific thought.
When Nietzsche writes of life and death in The Gay Science, he remarks that we should
avoid speaking of “laws of nature,” (GS §109) emphasizing that there are only
necessities.52 For Nietzsche, as we noted above, “Let us beware of saying that death is
opposed to life. The living is merely a type of what is dead, and a very rare type.” (GS

§109) Translated back into what is taught in the life-sciences, the organic, the more
organized, the autotelic motion, is a kind of inorganic, that is not so organized, that is
more chaotic, heterotelic motility. Hence Nietzsche can claim that “matter is as much of
an error as the God of the Eleatics,” that would be nous, that is mind, for the Eleatics that
is being as we recall Heidegger teaching us to read Parmenides that is the same to think
and to be.
This forms the basis of Nietzsche’s critique of causality. As he writes: we can only
perceive what is perceptible in material events but and by contrast, “for that for which we
have no sensibility” does not exist for us.53 Anything that goes beyond the domain, the
form, the sense of that sensibility, that is of our senses cannot be grasped or imagined.
Thus “for us” and very literally “such a thing cannot exist.”54
To be sure we have microscopes, telescopes, electron microscopes, super-colliders, just
in order to guess at those faster-than-light neutrinos and so on. But in order to give us
information at all, these instruments give us information on our terms.55 As we know,
handily from theorists of technology like Ellul, like Mumford, like Heidegger, and before
Heidegger like Friedrich Dessauer, Hegel’s student, our tools, our technologies, extend
our senses.56
Here I pass over Nietzsche’s uncanny references to death in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
I teach you the overhuman we read Zarathustra teaches the Übermensch.57 What is
significant in the current context is that death unites the two doctrines Zarathustra comes
to teach: both overhuman and eternal return of the same. Das Gleiche.58
Same old, same old.
Note here that Nietzsche does not say the same as, things taken again and again, day in,
day out, das Selbe. Das Gleiche. You, you yourself return not as you are now, with
everything you take yourself to be: you as you imagine yourself to have been and you as
expect yourself to become.
Much rather what returns is what was. Nietzsche doctrine of eternal recurrence
emphasizes the return of everything that has been: the past, the same as it was and every
tiny and major aspect of it: the same old, same old. The grass59 grows at the end of the

twilight of the gods.60 The same grass grows at Auschwitz, at Buchenwald, where we
have laid waste to Baghdad, and in Afghanistan, soon, and in Libya. And then there is
Korea and Vietnam, Verdun, Dresden.

Nietzsche and Schrödinger on the Subject
Our engagement with Schrödinger’s What is Life? has had us talking about death. Thus
Nietzsche reflects in the passage that initially caught Sontag’s attention: all these people
waiting at the port (here Nietzsche’s reference is Genoa), all of them poised to emigrate
effectively form “a brotherhood of death.” The image, the born, the ship about to embark
is classic and refers to both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius and indeed and to be sure to
Lucian’s Charon, the same ghostly ferryman featured in the same dialogue from which
Nietzsche takes his Overman: The Downward Journey.
In The Gay Science aphorism, The Thought of Death, this tacit brotherhood is the only
brotherhood there is for living subjects of consciousness, for subjects of desire, for
subjects such as ourselves all of us, born to mortality and thus bound to die, whether w
think about it or not. Nietzsche’s point is the philosophical point that living subjects
abjure the thought of death: it is the furthest thing from their minds.
We abjure death, we deny it, and we choose life instead, as Sontag also chose life and did
so until and of course — though we ourselves have no less difficulty grasping this notion
when it applies in our own individual case — that choice was no longer hers. For his part,
the economically (or dismally) minded Schopenhauer reflected that life was a business
that did not cover its costs, a business that from an economic point of view, a business
point of view, made absolutely no sense “as an enterprise,” and therefore was the only
thing that really compelled reflection.61 Nietzsche added more biology and more
thermodynamic statistics borrowed from Lord Kelvin — William Thomson — to the
same reflection, recognizing that abundance and waste was the way of life — and of
death. Hence he could argue with the best of 19th century cosmology, that a dancing star
was born of chaos, excess, confusion. Thus Schrödinger quotes Tagore in an Irish
climate: “The butterfly counts not months but moments, and has time enough.”62

If one takes the philosophical point of view, if one has a classical formation and if one
also happens to be a theoretical and mathematical cosmologist, one also knows that the
subject conscious of his own consciousness, the subject lying on his roof, the subject
moved by poetry and by bodily desire is still, and in every possible sense of the word,
looking at eternity.
We look out into eternity and find ourselves looking backwards.
We think, we ‘solve,’ the problems of the heavens themselves simply by thinking of the
universe in terms of what we call, using physicist’s metaphorical language, the Big Bang.
Like Goethe’s teasing Prometheus, as Nietzsche quotes this in his first book, and the little
steps that are the sins of women, if that is so, we do not mind it, with one big leap, the
men get there. Here the point is to skip over everything in between. Talk of the beginning,
like talk of the end does that.
And yet and already and since the turn of the last century, as Schrödinger reminds us in
1943, biology has become the province of physics.63
So what is life?
As physis, as natura, the answer is already patetn: life is emergent order, life is what
becomes of itself, what becomes out of itself, organizing itself in itself, by itself. And
what would be the difference between that and a crystal? Little enough say the scientists
— and to this day the parallel sticks because on the molecular level we have indeed to do
with crystal formations — and yet ...
And yet we have come to know better, although that better knowing doesn’t always
penetrate scientists writing for the popular press and it certainly takes its time before it
reaches philosophy, especially that of the uncritical scientistic kind, that is analytic
philosophy of the sort (and there are other kinds) that tends to dominate today, as what
we also call “mainstream” philosophy. And as Evelyn Fox Keller, who is herself as
respectably mainstream as anyone, but who is pro-science (as I happen to be pro-science)
without being scientistic (as I myself also happen not to be scientistic) has written:
For almost fifty years, we lulled ourselves into believing that, in discovering the
molecular basis of genetic information, we had found the ‘secret of life’; . . .

And we marveled at how simple the answer seemed to be. But now, in the call
for a functional genomics, we can at least read a tacit acknowledgement of how
large the gap between genetic ‘information’ and biological meaning really is.64
To the question “what is life?” Nietzsche’s reply is given, not unlike Schrödinger, in
economic terms, terms for Nietzsche borrowed from Schopenhauer but also terms attuned
to the cosmological balance of thermodynamic law. And if life can be regarded as kind of
business or energy equation, in terms of energetic efficiency, increasing negative entropy
means, as Nietzsche puts it, “shedding something that wants to die.” (GS §9)
Thus to be able to step lightly through life, to be able to live, is to be able to lose what
one does not need, what does not serve one. And when the organism loses this ability, it
is already dead. In the capitalist West of days gone by, businesses declare bankruptcy, in
the the West of the capitalist of the current world order insists on public bailouts. In a
Western religious context, spiritual advice tells us that if it hinders you, drop it. “Life is
shedding something that wants to die.” (Ibid.)
Nietzsche who died himself as a relatively young man (old enough to be old to his mind
— or to the mind of anyone younger than he was — but ‘young’ as Schrödinger would
have judged him) failed to master that one trick of life. Nor did he manage to die as he
taught in his Zarathustra: “at the right time.” (Z, On Voluntary Death) In this way, and
not unlike the great majority of us, Nietzsche became “too old for his victories” (as his
Zarathustra also says with regard to suicide: many become “too old for their truths and
their victories” (ibid.) and as Heidegger quotes Nietzsche in turn in his Being and Time.65
For Schrödinger, the trick of life is not a matter of aesthetic timing. Instead, the living
organism has to “suck in” order — countering, offsetting entropy. Here what is important
is that this uptake is quantifiable to the extent that entropy itself, as Schrödinger reminds
us is not a
hazy concept or idea, but a measurable physical quantity just like of the length
of a rod, the temperature at any point of a body, the heat of fusion of a given
crystal or the specific heat of any given substance. At the absolute zero point of
temperature (roughly -273°C) the entropy of any substance is zero.66

One lives by offsetting disorder:
Thus the device by which an organism maintains itself stationary at a fairly high
level of orderliness ( = fairly low level of entropy) really consists continually
sucking orderliness from its environment.67
To this extent, negative entropy counteracts what it is in you that wants to die, and as
Nietzsche emphasizes, something in a living entity drives not to pleasure (as the
utilitarians suppose) but the opposite of pleasure, unlust, as this goes along with and is
part of the passions themselves.
Or as Nietzsche says still more alluringly for the fitness buffs among us — this is what
his Zarathustra will mean when he urges the creators to “become hard,” that is as he
writes here in The Gay Science, as it is of course and as advertised, the “prelude” to
Zarathustra: “to be cruel and inexorable against everything about us that is growing old
and weak.” (GS §26) Nor does Nietzsche shy away from the point, it is one of the themes
of The Gay Science, whereby simply to live, this is the ineluctably Jainist metaphor is
“Constantly being a murderer? — and yet old Moses said: “Thou shalt not kill.” (Ibid.)
The nisus is an intriguing thing. The point at this juncture is that life and death already
include a connection with sex, of course: because as Nietzsche alludes to the Buddhists, if
a child is born to you, the fetter forged, the demon born to you, is not only an obligation,
you caused it — you care for it — but is also the symbol of your own death, your own
insignificance.68
Nietzsche stresses abundance: increasingly we are come to another kind of insight as we
human beings deal death all around us. Hijacking life, we call it science. Abusing life, we
“raise” domestic animals, caring for them, feeding them, automatically to be sure, in
factory farms which is their life as they know it: all of us, a nation of witches raising
animals in cages, like Hansel and Gretel, we fatten them for the kill. Nor do we breach
the question of animal subjectivity, animal consciousness as they die, as they go to their
deaths. What is the subject? What is consciousness?
We deal death. Our life, as Heraclitus and the other Preplatonic philosophers remind us,
is their death. This is no peaceful notion, strife, hatred: as we live life, everything around

us dies its death. Anaximander calls this the crime of existence. But the Greeks knew
that bloodshed costs, that life lost has its price. Thus we need, Nietzsche claimed this too,
purification. But after so many years we are so distant from this that it perhaps it makes
no sense to imagine it.
Maybe that is why the most popular focus for most philosophy is ethics, virtue ethics,
wisdom ethics, practical ethics, political theorizing: we do what we do, more than ever,
worse than ever and ask for justification.

Schrödinger’s Eternal Recurrence and the Subject
the human being who has never realized the strange features
of his own condition has nothing to do with philosophy
— Schrödinger
Schrödinger emphasizes the philosophical interests he began with, coupled too with a
keen interest in the Presocratic philosophers and bridging Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s
own interest in the Indian philosophies of the Vedanta. In his epilogue, after shocking the
reader with the declaration that, so he suggests, summarizes the general insight of all
mystic traditions, here including the Upanishads as he names them here as well as the
Cherubinic Wanderer (whom he does not name):
In Christian terminology to say: ‘Hence I am God Almighty’ sounds both
blasphemous and lunatic. But … in itself, the insight is not new. The earliest
records to my knowledge date back some 2,500 years or more. From the early
great Upanishads the recognition ATHMAN = BRAHMAN upheld in (the
personal self equals the omnipresent, all-comprehending eternal self) was in
Indian thought considered, far from being blasphemous, to represent the
quintessence of deepest insight into the happenings of the world. Again, the
mystics of many centuries, independently, yet in perfect harmony with each
other (somewhat like the particles in an ideal gas) have described, each of them,
the unique experience of his or her life in terms that can be condensed in the
phrase: DEUS FACTUS SUM (I am become God).”69

The French physician and philosopher of science, Michel Bitbol recognizes this as central
for Schrödinger, characterizing the equation Atman = Brahman, as nothing less than
Schrödinger’s “second” equation.70
Who or what is the subject? What are the implications of Schrödinger’s ‚second
equation‘: “Atman = Brahman (the personal self is identical with the omnipresent, allcomprehending eternal self)”? As Schrödinger continues to reflect, you are what you
know yourself to be and thus your memory tells you who you are, whenever you reflect
or attempt to tell yourself yourself, as Nietzsche puts it in his own reflections on the
nature of consciousness, as we count backwards, recollecting “the twelve trembling bellstrokes of our experiences, our lives, our being — ah!” and this ah, “ach!” in the original,
is how we know that we have to do with Nietzsche, “ah! And miscount ourselves in the
process …” (GM, Preface, i)
For Nietzsche, necessarily, incorrigibly, you are and can be no closer to those memories
of yourself, of your life as you lived it. “We are unknown to ourselves, we knowing-ones,
we ourselves to ourselves.” (Ibid.) For Nietzsche, even assuming (as he does assume) an
aesthetic justification of existence, a world of creative play, even noting that we have a
consciousness of this play, whether played by a cosmic Ur-Künstler or some divinity, we
are still and only played whereby and to be sure “our own consciousness regarding this
our significance is hardly other than the warriors painted on a canvas have of the battled
depicted upon it.” (BT §5)
We could almost be speaking of Arjuna and Krishna in conversation.
But Schrödinger’s reflection on subjective identity uses the same Schopenhauerian image
of figures painted on a canvas, reflecting on the stranger from Vienna that he is in the
strange land that is Irish Dublin, and refers to the present and to our possible
consciousness of our selves. Schrödinger’s point here is that you are your recollections
but that you are no closer to those memories of yourself, your life as you lived it, to the
people that you used to know, than a figure painted on a canvas and both Nietzsche and
Schrödinger borrow it from Schopenhauer, who himself doubtless takes it from
somewhere else,

Here for Schrödinger, the point is to refer to the present, the now that stays, or stands as
the mystics say in a parallel with eternity, as this was also Goethe’s reference to the
present that is our only happiness:
each of us has the indisputable impression that the sum total of his own
experience and memory forms a unit, quite distinct from that of any other
person. He refers to it as ‘I’ and What is this ‘I’? If you analyse it closely you
will, I think, find that it is just the facts little more than a collection of single
data (experiences and memories), namely (experiences and memories), namely
the canvas upon which they are collected. And you will, on close introspection,
find that what you really mean by ‘I’ is that ground-stuff upon which they are
collected. You may come to a distant country, lose sight of all your friends, may
all but forget them; you acquire new friends, you share life with them as
intensely as you ever did with your old ones. Less and less important will
become the fact that, while living your new life, you still recollect the old one.71
Schrödinger is highlighting the difference between the you, the subject you are now — as
we claim this subject to “have” subjectivity, but like the late Thomas Szasz, Schrödinger
points more to doing or being than to having — and the you you were, the you that was
you. Again, he distinguishes the self you are from your former self:
“The youth that was I,” you may come to speak of him in the third person,
indeed the protagonist of the novel you are reading is probably nearer to your
heart, certainly more intensely alive and better known to you. Yet there has been
no intermediate break, no death.
Ultimately the point of the thought experiment here concerns birth and rebirth and thus
the irrelevance of personal identity to it all, rather like the differently tuned experiment
that brings in Nietzsche’s demon at the conclusion of the Gay Science with respect to
what Nietzsche calls the greatest weight, that is the thought that, so he says, would if you
ever began to grasp it, crush you utterly, change you utterly.
even if a skilled hypnotist succeeded in blotting out entirely all your earlier
reminiscences, you would not find that he had killed you. In no case is there a
loss of personal existence to deplore. Nor will there ever be.72

To illustrate this, we may have recourse to Nietzsche’s pale criminal. We encounter him
in one form or another throughout Nietzsche’s writing: in The Gay Science, and in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra and again in Beyond Good and Evil and in The Genealogy of Morals
in one or more guises. A lawyer appointed to represent our criminal, or anyone guilty of
a crime would do well, as advocate, to teach him the one emotion Nietzsche claims does
not grow or bloom in jail, that is the feeling of remorse and that is just because of the
point Schrödinger makes about consciousness and in prison there are all kinds of other
things to worry about. This distraction is the ineluctable, incorrigibility of the present
although with good preparation from one’s lawyer one can work around even that. After
the crime, the criminal has no remorse (and this is coming at the phenomenon from the
other side of the crime) while, as Nietzsche points out, beforehand, as it were, he also has
no presentiment of crime as such, because in neither, before the crime he is about to
commit (this is why premeditation matters so much) and after the crime the crime with
which he is charged, is he the same as the one who commits the crime. In other words,
more simply expressed: he does not know why he killed, save out of what Nietzsche with
a strange precision called the joy of it, which the prisoner may well recall, yet without the
same consciousness of the deed that is the consciousness that concerns Schrödinger and
Nietzsche. Johnny Cash’s parodic line in the song Folsom Prison gives some voice to
self-distancing, even in an inculpatory mode: but I killed a man in Reno just to watch him
die.
Exculpatory or not, the point here is that Johnny Cash takes the prisoner’s side in this
(and every prisoner who heard him sing understood this) in a precisely Zarathustran
fashion: there is no why and you are guilty.
Like the rose — and Georges Bataille takes this argument to the extreme of extremes in
his Inner Experience but above all in the Tears of Eros — the murderer is without why.
For most of us, this is impossible to believe and yet the Greeks who invented the mind
also invented courts of law. For Schrödinger, lovers know something about the
consciousness of the other. To the extent that they do love, one might talk as John Dewey
does about art as the pinnacle of existence, as the high point of sex. Bataille is quite overt
about this, Nietzsche not so overt but this is what the Apollonian and the Dionysian are
about. The whole point of the erotic encounter is that it is a vision intense, imaginary,

fantasy, union with the other. It is just this that Lacan denies by saying that there is no
sexual relation, but Lacan —womanizer that he was — hardly means by this that there
are no sexual encounters: no sex, far from it. Lacan means exactly what he says (just as
Szasz who says, contra psychiatry, that there is no mental illness argues not against
mental troubles or sorrows or problems but against the organic claim that ties the last to
physical, bodily, objectively diagnosable illness). What Lacan means, and he tends to be
right in this regard, is that there is little relating going on in the sexual relations that go
on constantly, all that “constant craving” as this characterizes popular advertisement
culture on so many levels.73
Schrödinger however always maintained the poet’s insight that two can be one. To
understand this, note both that such a union between lovers is rarely attained and that
even those consummations that are attained do not remain as such — a disappointment
that inspires the whole of Goethe’s Faust. Thus most or many or almost all erotic
relations are relations between those who remain others to one another: only the barest
hint of oneness and apart from that no transcendence one to another.
And just to the extent that Schrödinger’s was the soul of lover,74 Schrödinger could not
but share the same belief (bad or good) faith Sartre underscores above. To this same
extent Schrödinger believed every lie he ever told (and it was surely true when he spoke
it) and his real secret was, like any seducer, that he managed to persuade the women he
loved to deal with the other women he also loved — or wanted to love. This is the
Machiavellian art of managing to have his ladies, his wife included, accept his
infidelities. The point here is that the only way to do this, and this contrasts with many
lesser men with lesser souls and lesser minds, is by telling the truth. Thus, and this is also
how such ‘management’ works — it’s good to give a loved one something else to do
besides sit by the phone — Schrödinger was tolerant in turn, allowing the women in his
also to be unfaithful to him (his wife, Annemarie Bertel, had love affairs of her own,
notably with Hermann Weyl, where the only thing that matters is that she stayed with
Schrödinger, true to their marriage vows, until he died).
Erotic registers, like a list of traffic tickets, are incomplete violations apart from those we
know, and the womanizer counts on the limitations of what beloved can know or even
imagine.

Read like a police report, i.e., just the facts, we can read that Schrödinger seduced
Hildegunde March, the wife of Arthur March, with whom he had one of his daughters,
and that he went on to seduce many more, having two additional daughters by two
additional Irish women.
We say, as Schrödinger’s philosophically conventional biographer says, and as it makes
far more sense to say, this was just the way it was fin de siècle Vienna, you know, like the
late Stephen Toulmin and the still living Allan Janik’s account of Wittgenstein’s Vienna,
for people like Wittgenstein and what we suppose ourselves to know of his homoerotic
persuasion. Vienna, where, gateway to the orient as it is, they inscrutably managed to get
their eros into high art, extraordinary images.
Paul Feyerabend, who also hailed from Vienna, knew what it was to know nothing about
the one thing about which everyone might speak (this is the erotic, and Feyerabend
throughout his life spoke as a man who was physically unable to do much with the erotic
domain after his injury as a relatively young man). But because of this perhaps
Feyerabend was more sensitive than most to the conditions of knowledge, that is what is
needed to speak of knowledge or to make judgments about it. Thus Feyerabend
challenged scientists and academics who condemn astrology, observing that their
rejection could not be taken seriously. The same scientists and scholars knew (and
wanted to know) nothing about astrology. Thus, again as Feyerabend pointed out, these
same scientists lacked a scientific knowledge of the subject — one way or another.
Feyerabend’s argument is scientifically enlightened with respect to astrology (note that
this hardly makes him an adherent),75 and he extended it to the example of Western
medicine and Eastern acupuncture, arguing that one needed knowledge to judge such
traditions.
Scientifically speaking, critically speaking, you’d need to know a science cold, its history
and its claims, the doing of that science, before claiming the right to name it hokum,
tying it to a metaphorical stake and burning it as pseudoscience.
Learning astrology, reviewing the data, is not what the scientists who condemn it bother
to do (which was Feyerabend’s point as it was also Mary Midgley’s point in her review
on behalf of Sheldrake as we cited this at the start) nor is it what more humanistically
oriented academics do. Instead, and based on what we take ourselves to know, these are

prejudgments and this is how prejudice works, we condemn whole traditions that simply
happen to be other than the ones we know and can judge. This otherness is how western
science condemns eastern science, how modern science condemns medieval science
(correcting this was the obsession of Pierre Duhem’s later life), and indeed ancient Greek
science.76 This otherness is why Western medicine calls everything else ‘alternative’
medicine, language that institutes its approach as canonic. Here the hermeneutic issue is
that this is how prejudice works. Its limitations means that it is anything but scientific,
meaning one who seeks to know by testing (‘tasting’ as Nietzsche points out), one who is
open to experience, i.e., enlightenment.

Resumé and Conclusion
Talking about Schrödinger and honoring what de Nicolás has had to tell us about Indian
philosophy, about consciousness, we have had recourse to aesthetic elegance and, in the
case of Schrödinger, to sexual inclinations and passions or dedicated excess(es), as well
as to his famous wave equation and to his first time use of the word “code” when talking
about the transfer of genetic information. The last reference remains tricky because
Schrödinger was not necessarily arguing in his own text that the same genetic coding that
matters to us was necessarily interior to the cell, as we take it to be where we take genes
to be, simply because for Schrödinger what was at stake was the relation between the
inside of the cell and the outside of the cell.
The issue was a matter of economy, as Avenarius and Mach would say and as
Schrödinger emphasized the relevance of this notion. For Schrödinger, the point would
only be that the code, however it worked,77 was impingent on the system as such: it came
from without. When scholars want to complement Schrödinger they find themselves
setting his idea of the code into the cell rather than beyond it as he actually argues — and
as his point requires. Here to conclude I note only that the problem remains: how does
the inside get outside, how does the code code, how, in other words, does nucleotide
transcription really work, in vivo?
What we exclude by way of our focus on Schrödinger’s poetry and his supposed
depression and his supposed erotic abandonment, as Gumbrecht underscores, even to his
vacations, or by mentioning his sartorial elegance, or (at the time) scandalous sensuality

and even by focusing on his mathematical ingenuity, is Schrödinger’s enduring concern
with the subject (him- or herself) as Schrödinger was concerned with consciousness and
time. And both consciousness and time are philosophical issues.
What is striking about consciousness for Schrödinger, and here he echoes Husserl and
Heidegger as much as Nietzsche, is its extraordinary temporality:
consciousness is always now. There is really no before and after for mind. And it is never
multiple, not even when it is you, not even when you dialogue with yourself, that is why
Aristotle can speak of thinking as the soul’s converse with itself, because such a thing is
possible, you do not know, in the sense of experience, both sides.78

Thus Schrödinger emphasizes
the empirical fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in
the singular. Not only has none of us even experienced more than one
consciousness, but there is no trace of circumstantial evidence of this ever
happening anywhere in the world.79
This point was one Schrödinger was at pains to make thus he writes:
When in the puppet-show of dreams we hold in hand the strings of quite a
number of actors, controlling their actions and their speech, we are not aware of
this being so. Only one of them is myself, the dreamer. In him, I act and speak
immediately, while I may be awaiting eagerly and anxiously what another will
reply (...). That I could really let him do and say whatever I please does not
occur to me (...)80
Nietzsche offers a related reflection, when he writes of appearance as a “a dance of spirits
and nothing more,” he also reflects, and this is he learned from Schopenhauer as much as
from Kant enlightenment about appearance changes no part of it: “…I woke up in the
midst of this dream but only to the consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must go
on dreaming, lest I perish, as a somnambulist must go on dreaming lest he fall…” (GS §
54)
When you set about to think about a problem or question, you may not instantly see a
solution (in fact sometimes you still don’t, not even after thinking about it for hours,
days, years). Sometimes, like Descartes, and for thinkers like Schrödinger, an insight can

come to you readymade, as if or literally in a dream. Like a leaf, as Nietzsche uses the
metaphor, it floats whole, into your lap.
Arjuna and Krishna — again.
Poincaré offers a statistical, very Schrödinger like, mathematician’s proof of eternal
recurrence.81 Poincaré’s point was Nietzsche’s point, which is not to say that Nietzsche
had the mathematical prowess to work out a similar proof.82 Nietzsche’s concern with
respect to the eternal recurrence and personal identity was not mathematics but
consciousness. Thus he also emphasized, with regard to the pale criminal, that one has
little other than conviction or belief that would link one to one’s own past acts. Personal
identity even in this life, as Nietzsche (and Sartre as we saw above), follow
Schopenhauer’s reflections on human nature, is a matter of consciousness and identity
with one’s past consciousness is tied to belief.
In other words, what we know as personal identity is not guaranteed after death and yet
continuity is.
This too Nietzsche seeks to foreground with his own talk of eternal recurrence.83
Nietzsche’s concern with respect to the eternal recurrence and personal identity was not
mathematics but consciousness. Thus he also emphasized, as already noted with regard to
the pale criminal, that one has little other than one’s convictions or beliefs to link one in
the present to one’s own past acts. Personal identity even in this life, as Nietzsche (and
Sartre as we saw above), follow Schopenhauer’s reflections on human nature, is a matter
of consciousness and identity with one’s past consciousness is tied to belief.
Schrödinger the modern man gives this illustration of this Schopenhauerian point: your
consciousness is not identical with — you are not, you do not have, you do not share—
the consciousness of your younger self. Thus when it comes to consciousness you have
more chance of sharing consciousness at the real pinnacle of existence, erotic love —
which is not just about sexual climax but the oneness Schrödinger describes (perhaps he
should have written Valentine’s day cards?) when he writes
those true lovers who, as they look into each other’s eyes, become aware that
their thought and their joy are numerically one — not merely similar or
identical; but they, as a rule, are emotionally too busy to indulge in clear
thinking, which respect they very much resemble the mystic.

But the point of difference remains. It is the same one Derrida tries to make, without
referring to either Schrödinger or Schopenhauer or the Upanishads when he writes about
the person who promises to love and the person he now is, and it is the hard-gentle words
Schrödinger is reported as having offered one of his lovers when he points out what she
herself also would know, we were once as one. That was then and that then is not now.
Between the two of them together reflecting on the truth of that truth could not but have
broken resistance. Because the endearing thing about Schrödinger was that he liked as
much as possible to keep his loves, even while moving on to other lovers.
Seduction, anti-seduction, a dynamic play between lovers who have lost their love which
never really works as planned. Passed-over lovers never quite believed Schrödinger’s
rhetoric but had to concede the truth of what he said. For everything follows from that
disjunction — if what one means by love is union — and every lover, every poet with the
soul of a lover knows that what one means by love is union. Two are one (or as
Nietzsche varies that, loving himself as we know that he did, one can become two, but
even that passes:
Da, plötzlich, Freundin! wurde eins zu zwei—.
—Und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei
In point fact, intriguingly, it is when you love that you love so very much that you want
to promise forever, that you want nothing so much as to hitch your love to your future
self, whether it wants it or not and even though it certainly will not want it.
Remember Nietzsche’s little aphorism love of god likewise.
Love of one is a piece of barbarism: for it is practiced at the expense of all others,
Love of God likewise. (BGE §67)
For Schrödinger, to go back to mind and eternity, you, the subject, lose nothing by the
fact that you lose your subjective, personal identity just because you, qua subject, lose it
all the time. As Nietzsche says every bit of our consciousness, especially our higher
consciousness, depends upon forgetting: to be morally, ethically human we must get
ourselves a memory and we do create a memory for ourselves in our ethical and civic
laws, which we burn into ourselves. This is also the assault on the body: only that which
is inscribed with pain, says Nietzsche, and this is so important for Freud’s theory of the
unconscious and trauma, can be remembered. And we do remember, as Nietzsche says,

five or six I will nots, and thus commandments to be remembered are negative and thus
commandments include a threat, a promise of vengeance, of loss.
It is for this reason that we say when we marry not I will love you forever but yes I will,
meaning yes I will not: I will cleave to you only, renouncing all others till the end of
time, all others, no matter who they are, no matter how true or right for me they may be.
You do not know the you you were for Schrödinger because you do not have
consciousness of that you: you are not aware of that you, and even your memory which is
what you do have, even the vividness of your memory, fades. This is the reason we tell a
grieving friend that time heals all wounds, just as the marvelous Fiona Shaw, the actress
explains in that over-long and over-wrought academic film, namely Terry Malick’s Tree
of Life. Because, and of course it is true: time heals all wounds because in time we forget.
Yet the consciousness of grief, like the consciousness of erotic, ecstatic erotic love (i.e.,
true love) does not want to hear or permit that it, this pain, this love, shall pass, but wants
instead to burn its Eros, but above all its loss, its pain, its grief into memory. The
American Indians of the northern plains, cut off a finger to create such a memory for
themselves, and although Nietzsche does not refer to them explicitly here, this is the point
that he likewise seeks to make. We do something much gentler when we put on a
wedding ring to remind ourselves of a promise we have made.
For Schrödinger, there is no difference between you that says I and the universe: you are
already everything and you do not know it, except that you can master the trick of
thinking this identity, as Nietzsche also mused. In this sense we know that we are those
who have figured out that we are figures in the dream of a god who dreams.
For Nietzsche, you can learn to bless life, love fate, amor fati or not. In any case, what is
significant is the long run, the highest feeling, eternity. Thus when he writes contra the
usual role of the promises of the afterlife in an early unpublished note, “My teaching
says, Thus to live that you would wish to live again is the task — you will do so in any
case.“84
Thus you will, in any case, be reborn, again and again. But reborn, your consciousness is
no more connected to your consciousness than your consciousness is identical with the
consciousness of drinking this morning’s cup of coffee, provided you were conscious

enough after last night’s party (assuming there was a party, assuming you were invited)
to remember to have a cup of coffee to begin with. As Nietzsche reflects on pride and
memory: “‘I have done that’ says my memory. That I cannot have done — says my pride
and remains inexorable. Finally — memory yields.” (BGE §68)
You are no longer present to the past self that you were, you are not conscious of the past.
Once again, we turn to the young Schrödinger:
I venture to call it [the mind] indestructible since it has a peculiar time-table,
namely mind is always now. There is really no before and after for the mind.
There is only now that includes memories and expectations.85
We may, or so I believe, assert that physical theory in its present stage strongly
suggests the indestructibility of Mind by Time.86
Or
“It is by observing and thinking this way that one may suddenly experience the
truth of the fundamental idea of Vedânta. It is impossible that this unity of
knowledge, of feeling and of choice that you consider as YOURS was born a
few years ago from nothingness. Actually, this knowledge, this feeling and this
choice are, in their essence, eternal, immutable and numerically ONE in all men
and in all living beings (...). The life that you are living presently is not only a
fragment of the whole existence; it is in a certain sense, the WHOLE”87
Nothing of what Schrödinger says here is without seeming paradox, and it is not for
nothing that he suggests that Western science and understanding can do with an
“infusion” of Eastern wisdom.88 But he says this with respect to the notion of the subject,
the you that you are and indeed with respect to the objects you take to exist around you.
And thus not at all abstract, the issue for Schrödinger is as personal as it was for
Nietzsche, which is to say that what Schrödinger says is all about his own being, the “I”
but that means that it is about you, yourself and what makes you you (rather than, as
Schroödinger also reflects some other being, your brother or your father. Thus for
Schrödinger as for Nietzsche, you will be reborn, that he argues is certain, but to say that
could not possibly be to say that you will remember this life or any part of it.
[As] inconceivable as it seems to ordinary reason, you—and all other conscious
beings as such — are all in all. Hence this life of yours which you are living is
not merely a piece of the entire existence, but is in a certain sense the whole;
only this whole is not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance.

This, as we know, is what the Brahmans express in that sacred, mystic formula
which is yet really so simple and clear: Tat tvam asi, this is you. Or, again, in
such words as ‘I am in the east and in the west, I am below and above, I am this
whole world.89
Note that you are no longer conscious of the start of these reflections now that it is
nearing its end: unless you took notes as you went along. But even then you are merely
recognizing the note, reconstructing your earlier awareness. The eternal recurrence is not
what Woody Allen says it is, it does not mean that he or anyone else will have to sit
through the ice capades again and again, it is not the wretched Michael Keaton film
Ground Hog Day — I mention these two physically fairly unattractive movie stars, cast
as they are, as Woody Allen is fond of casting himself, as romantic leading men, in order
to point out that they are the subjects rather than the objects of desire in their romantic
comedies.
For all subjects, this is the meaning of what it is to be a subject, are unattractive by
definition. The subject is not the desired, the subject is not the judged and evaluated. The
subject is the subject who desires, who judges, evaluates, or as Nietzsche said, wills
(where it matters very much indeed that only men are those who will for Nietzsche)
because the subject is the observer and thus conscious as such, rather than being the
object of consciousness (at the same time, it should go without saying that none of us
should be learning the meaning of Nietzsche’s eternal return from a movie).
To put this in Schrödinger’s words,
Without being aware of it, and without being rigorously systematic about it, we
exclude the Subject of Cognizance from the domain of nature that we endeavor
to understand. We step up with our own person back into the part of the
onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure
becomes an objective world.90
Instead, like a speck of dust, as the demon says, the hourglass of existence is turned
upside down, again and again. That is to say, so Nietzsche argues at the end of his 19th
century and we may think of this as an harmonic oscillator, the universe is so cycled.
This cycling is Empedoclean, Heraclitean, Anaximandrean, and Parmenidean but it is
perhaps above all a Vedic notion. This is the Atman and as Nietzsche says — more
modern than any of us, making the same point Neils Bohr makes about his horse shoes
and about superstition in the realm of the Real — shaking his head: du wirst es jedenfalls.

This is you, as Schrödinger says, repeating Descartes’s point most powerful point about
the need for creation/conservation,and it is you in any case.
Say yea or nay to recurrence, as Nietzsche says, “you will do so in any case” — what
eternally recurs recurs in any case. For Schrödinger:
“It is certain that the earth will give birth to you again and again, for new
struggles and for new sufferings. And not only in the future : it resuscitates you
now, today, every day, not just once but several thousand times, exactly as it
buries you every day several thousand times (...). (For) the present is the only
thing which has no end”91

— Endnotes —
1

This essay grows out of a text presented as a graduate lecture at Fordham University for students from
Fordham and the University of Antwerp in mid-September, 2011. Both Antonio De Nicolás and Patrick
Heelan were mentioned on this occasion with reference to Fordham and to Stony Brook.
2
This doctrine is introduced by way of the penultimate aphorism (“The Greatest Weight” [GS §341]) of the
first published version of The Gay Science, which ends with the section Incipit tragödia (GS §341) that
recurs verbatim as the first section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Thus connections between Nietzsche’s
books tends to be elusive (Nietzsche’s famous aphoristic style seems to lead literary and philosophic
scholars to ignore their genesis and read them periodically, insisting on three periods (divided like Gaul or
the persons in the one God, I am not sure which). What is certain is that authors read Nietzsche’s texts in
isolation from one another, which further fuels — and blinds source scholarship. At any rate, and to date
scholars have tended not to read The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra together. I argued for this in
several places and I differ from other scholars in that I contend that this is further complicated by the
importance of Niertzsche’s first book on tragedy for The Gay Science. See Babich, “Gay Science: Science
and Wissenschaft, Leidenschaft and Music” in: Keith Ansell-Pearson, ed., Companion to Nietzsche
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 97-114 as well as “The Science of Words or Philology: Music in The
Birth of Tragedy and The Alchemy of Love in The Gay Science” in: Tiziana Andina, ed., Revista di
estetica, n.s. 28, XLV (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2005), pp. 47-78.
3
The context in Nietzsche’s second Untimely Mediation, namely, “Schopenhauer as Educator” is also one
of Nietzsche’s earliest expressions of life affirmation and the question that leads to his notion of the eternal
return. Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), Vol. 1 p. 362.
4
Reading Nietzsche on the theme of life is an inherently esoteric undertaking given Nietzsche’s own
discipline of ancient philology, i.e., what we call classics today. This esoteric dimensionality was especially
close to Nietzsche via his friend and colleague, the Heidelberg philologist, Erwin Rohde, who was not only
an expert on the 2nd century satirist, Lucian as well as the Greek concept of soul or spirit and mind, as
author of the two-volume, Psyche. See Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls & The Belief in Immortality
Among the Greeks, introduction by W.K.C. Guthrie, trans. W.B. Hills (New York: Harper & Row, 1966);
originally: Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen (Tübingen: Mohr 1894).
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